印度：商业与种姓制度（中）

Basic training基本训练

Infosys's training scheme, as described by S. Sadagopan, the IIIT'S director, is a Pygmalion undertaking. Meeting the parents of his dalit students, he saw “almost an anger in their eyes”. For the first month the students were unresponsive. Their English was dismal. Mr Sadagopan felt compelled to introduce lessons in self-presentation, including table manners.

IIIT公司董事S. Sadagopan把Infosys公司的培训计划形容为一个皮格梅隆式的任务(注：皮格梅隆,塞浦路斯国王，他雕刻了一个妇女的塑像然后陷入对她的爱恋中.)。在与那些达利特学生的父母会面时，他看到“几乎是愤怒的感情充满他们眼睛”。那些学生在第一个月的培训中显得懒懒散散。他们的英文水平让人沮丧。Sadagopan因此感到有必要强制引入包括餐桌礼仪在内的自我展示课程。

Matters improved. The course was based on Infosys's 16-week basic training, which 31,000 Indian graduates underwent last year. The low-caste lot scored similar marks and gained confidence. At a bonding session, filled with meditation and dancing, they wrote themselves a slogan: “As good as any, better than many”.

情况这才有所改善。这个课程建立在Infosys公司为期十六周的基本培训之上，去年有31000名印度毕业生学习过。多数低种姓学生得到的分数相似，并获得自信心。在载歌载舞的亲善大会会上，他们为自己制作了一条标语“象任何人一样好，比大多数人棒”。

It is a moving story. But Mr Sadagopan's students were not all that deprived. In the words of three, now working for Infosys, they were “normal middle-class Indians”. A third of them were the sons and daughters of professionals. The worst had grades only a little below what Infosys routinely demands of its recruits. Almost all were from urban areas, where caste discrimination is rare.

故事令人感动。但是Sadagopan的学生并非都是缺乏教育的学生。现在这些正在为Infosys公司工作的学生，可以用几个词来形容他们——“标准印度中产阶级”。他们之中有三分之一是从事专业技术的人员。他们中所受教育程度最差的人，也不过比Infosys公司招募新员工时的常规要求稍微低一点罢了。几乎所有人都来自于很少有种姓歧视的城市。

One of them, Manjunath, says the only time he was ever reminded of his low caste was when he applied for a place at university. Had it not been reserved for him, he says, he might have worked a bit harder—and so joined Infosys without any special help. As for his colleague from Bannahalli Hundi, coming from one of the richer families in the village, she is its first female university graduate—of any caste.

其中一个名叫Manjunath的学生说，唯一一次他对自己的低种姓印象是在申请大学里的某个职位的时候。他说，本来也许他加把劲就能够申请到那个职位，那并不是专为限制他的——然后未经任何特殊帮助他进入了Infosys公司。至于他来自于Bannahalli Hundi村庄里比较富有的家庭之一的同事，她是那里所有低种姓人里的首位女大学毕业生。

The most that can be said for Infosys's programme—without devaluing Mr Sadagopan's efforts—is that it is a great opportunity for a tiny number of middle-class Indians, who happen also to be low-caste. The same would be true of caste-based reservations. This is because the percentage of India's workforce employed in the “organised” private sector (made up of firms that declare they have ten or more employees), where reservations might be applied, is also tiny: around 2%. And as far as anyone can tell (companies do not ask the caste of their employees), members of low castes are already well represented in low-skilled jobs there. Much of India's heavy industry, such as steelmaking, is located where the low-caste population is high. Tata Steel, which employs around 40,000 people in India, has its main operations in Jamshedpur, in the eastern “tribal belt”.

最值得一提的可能是，Infosys公司的这一计划恰是印度数量微小的中产阶级的一个极好的机会，因为他们碰巧也属于低种姓的一员——这并非贬低Sadagopan的努力。这种机会也体现在种姓预留职位中。这是因为在印度的劳动力就业率里，“有组织的”私营部门(由最少雇佣了十名雇员的公司组成)可提供给预留职位的份额同样微小——大约2%。以至于任何人都能断定(因为企业并不在意雇员的种姓)，低种姓员工已经大量出现在了低技术需求的岗位上。印度的许多重工业，例如炼钢业，已经查明是低种姓人群最密集的地方。塔嗒钢铁公司在印度雇佣了大约40000名雇员，主要生产基地詹谢普尔市也位于东部的“部落地带”。

Membership of a caste, as of a guild or a church, provides businessmen with a useful network. In the informal economy, where banks fear to tread, caste bonds tend to be affirmed through business. The fact that most Indian companies are family-owned exaggerates this: to prevent wealth being diluted, it encourages marriages not only within the same caste, but also within the same family. A sugar baroness of south India's kamma caste, Rajshree Pathy, recently explained this practice to an Indian newspaper, the Business Standard: “The PSG family produces girls, the Lakshmi Mills family produces boys, they marry each other and live happily ever after.”

种姓资格类似于行业协会或者教派，为商业提供了有利的关系网络。在银行业不愿意踏足的非正规经济部门，赤裸裸的种姓联合往往是受到肯定的。印度的大多数公司归家族所有，这一特征使得这种情况更加明显：为防止财富被稀释，它鼓励不仅仅在同种种姓间通婚，而且提倡在同一家族之间通婚。南部印度kamma种姓的食用糖女爵Rajshree Pathy最近向印度《商业标准报》阐述了这种惯常的做法：“PSG家庭生育姑娘，Lakshmi Mills家庭生育男孩，然后他们结为夫妻，从此幸福地生活在一起。”

The modernisation of India's economy has brought more dynamic change. Among educated, urban Indians caste identity is fading. Inter-caste marriages are increasing. According to Jeevansathi.com, a matchmaking (or, as Indians say, “matrimonial”) website, 58% of its online matches involved inter-caste couples. Meanwhile, in rural India—where unions are not fixed online—intra-caste marriages remain the norm.

印度经济的现代化已经带来了更多动态的变化。在受过教育的人群中，城市印度人的种姓身份影响正在消退。跨种姓婚姻数量一直在增长。根据配媒(印度人称为“婚介”)网Jeevansathi.com的数据，网上结合的58%可划为跨种姓婚姻。与此同时，印度农村的跨种姓婚姻仍保持在正常水平——这些地方的婚姻数据并未在网上体现出来。

Business has to some degree been a laggard in this process. Caste bonds rooted in expediency, not tradition, allow businessmen to borrow and lend money with a degree of accountability, which helps to minimise risk. They are not an affirmation of a vocational hierarchy within the Hindu universe. Nonetheless, in north India, where business is to this day dominated by members of ancient trading castes, like marwaris (whose famous names include Birla, Bajaj and Mittal) and bania (Ambani), it can look pretty traditional.

商业在这个进程中已经慢了一拍。种姓联合的根源是一己私利，而非传统，它使得商业人士借贷现款时带有某种责任感，从而降低了风险。种姓联合不是印度教领域里的职业阶层定位。尽管如此，在北部印度，时至今日商业仍然被传统的贸易种姓成员控制着，例如marwaris（他们中显赫的家族包括Birla, Bajaj 和 Mittal）和bania（Ambani家族），这可以看做是纯粹的传统。

Rites of passage继承途径

Harish Damodaran investigated the caste origins of many of India's industrialists in a forthcoming book*. He identified three main trends. The first, which he calls a “bazaar to factory” route, is the passage of hereditary traders into industry. In northern India, some castes' monopolies have discouraged them from leaving their traditionally prescribed employment. So members of north India's farming castes—for example, jats and yadavs—rarely own a sugar or flour mill.

Harish Damodaran在即将出版的一本书中，研究了很多印度实业家的种姓起源。他确定了三种主要的趋势。第一种，他称之为“杂货店到工厂”路线，是世袭商人进入工业的途径。在北部印度，某些种姓的垄断已使他们不愿意离开传统的就业方式。因此，北部印度的农业种姓成员——例如贾特人和yadavs人——很少拥有糖厂或面粉厂。

The second trend, “office to factory”, describes a recent movement of well-educated high-caste Hindus, including brahmins, into business. Lacking capital, these sophisticates tended to enter the services sector, where start-up costs are relatively low. India's world-class computer-services industry, including companies like Infosys, is the result.

第二种趋势是“办公室到工厂”路线，它揭示了受过良好教育的高种姓阶层转向商业的最新动向，例如印度教徒和婆罗门。由于缺乏资金，这些精打细算的阶层倾向于进入启动资金相对较低的服务行业。印度世界级的计算机服务工业就是这一动向的结果，例如Infosys公司。

The third trajectory, “field to factory”, is the transition into the business world of members of India's middle and lower-peasant castes. This must be the path of India's dalits, too. But they have not trodden it yet: across India, Mr Damodaran could not find a significant dalit industrialist.

第三种方式称做“农场到工厂”，是印度中下层工农种姓向商业领域过渡的一个模式。这肯定也是印度贱民需要走的路线。但是他们仍然没有踏上这条通途：在全部印度，达莫达兰未能找到哪怕一个成功的达利特实业家。

There is no strong evidence that companies discriminate against low-caste job applicants. Upper-class Indians, who tend also to be high-caste Hindus, can be disparaging about their low-caste compatriots. “Once a thicky, always a thicky,” is how a rich businessman describes Ms Mayawati. Yet this at least partly reflects the fact that low-caste Hindus tend also to be low class; and in India, as in many countries, class prejudice is profound.

并没有明显的证据表明企业歧视低种姓的应征者。上流社会印度人——大多数也属于高种姓印度教徒——会对他们的低种姓同胞嗤之以鼻。“一日为贱，终生为贱” Ms Mayawati这么形容一位非常富有的商界人士。不过这至少也部分反映出来一个事实：低种姓的印度教徒往往也是低阶层；同许多其他国家一样，印度的阶级歧视很深。

There is, on the other hand, plenty of evidence that few able low-caste graduates are emerging from India's universities. Since it began registering the caste of its subscribers—almost by definition computer-literate and English-speaking—Naukri.com has added 38,000 young dalit and tribal job-seekers to its books. That represents 1% of the total who have registered in that time.

从另一方面看，有充分证据表明，印度的大学中几乎没有大量涌现有才干的低种姓毕业生。自从开始登记用户的种姓阶层以来，Naukri.com的求职名单上网增加了38000位达利特和部落求职者。这个数字只占同一时期注册的全部低种姓人数的1%。

For reservationists, this confirms the need for quotas. Others interpret the facts differently: reservations don't seem to work. And statistics support this view. Reservations notwithstanding, low-caste Indians are getting less poor at almost the same rate as the general population. Between 1983 and 2004, their spending power increased by 26.7%, compared with 27.7% for the average Indian, according to the National Sample Survey Organisation, a government body.

预留主义者认为这正好印证了配额的必要性。其他人对此的解读却有所不同：预留制度看起来似乎并不起作用。并且统计数据支持这个观点。尽管有预留职位，然而低种姓印度人脱贫的速率却和普通大众几乎不相上下。根据政府机构全国抽样调查组织(NSSO)的数据,从1983到2004年间，他们的购买力增加了26.7%，同期印度的平均购买力增长为27.7%。

Low-caste students struggle in schools without special help, which is rarely available. Their English—the language of India's middle class—tends to be poor. Many drop out. Up to half of university places reserved for low-caste students are left vacant. So, too, are many of the university posts reserved for low-caste teachers. Most Indians emerge from this system with an abysmal education. Low-caste Indians perhaps almost invariably do.

没有额外帮助的低种姓学生在学校里刻苦学习的情况十分少见。他们的英语（印度的中产阶级语言）水平往往较差。许多人干脆半途而废。多达一半的大学入学名额留给低种姓学生不过是空谈。因而，许多大学的职位也给低种姓的教师预留。大多数印度人都带着糟糕的教育离开了教育系统。或许低种姓印度人无一例外全部如此。

A measure of this fiasco can be found at the political-science department of one of India's prestigious post-graduate universities. Each year it chooses 50 students, from 1,500 applications, for its master's degree. Successful applicants will average no less than 55% in their undergraduate exams. Dalit applicants scrape in with as little as 30%. Nonetheless, practically every student will be awarded a first-class degree.

这种教育上的失败可以从印度一所颇负名望的研究生学院的政治系那里衡量出来。每年它从1500名申请者中挑选出50名授予硕士学位。成功申请者的本科毕业考试成绩平均合格率不低于55%。达利特申请者的合格率则只勉强够得上30%。然而，几乎每个学生都会被授予优等学位。

India is failing to equip its young, of whatever caste or religion, with the skills that its companies need. This is one of the biggest threats to sustaining high economic growth. India's outstanding computer-services companies—which will account for around a quarter of overall growth in the next few years—intend to hire over 1m engineering graduates in the next two years. It will be tough. To recruit 31,000 graduates last year, Infosys considered 1.3m applicants; only 65,000 passed a basic test. To address the skills shortage, the company is investing a whopping $450m in training. “We are building India's human resources,” says Mohandas Pai, Infosys's chief of human resources.

印度没有能力把企业所需要的技能教给年轻人——无论低种姓后裔还是宗教后裔。这是影响其经济增长持续性的最大威胁之一。印度杰出的计算机服务公司——它们将为接下来几年里的全部经济增长贡献大约四分之一力量——打算在随后的两年中雇用一百多万名工科毕业生。任务很艰巨。去年Infosys公司为招聘31000名毕业生测验了130万名申请人，通过基本测试的只有65000人。为提高专业技能，Infosys公司在培训上投入了高达4.5亿美元费用。Infosys公司的人力资源总监Mohandas Pai说：“我们建立的是全印度的人力资源库”。

Alas, reservationists have other concerns. Caste politics are pervasive. On August 28th the Supreme Court struck down an effort by Andhra Pradesh's government to reserve 4% of government jobs and education places for poor Muslims. The court is meanwhile weighing a more dramatic measure announced by the government last year: to reserve 27% of university places for the OBCs. To placate irate students, many of them high-caste, the government promises to increase the number of university places accordingly. Education standards would no doubt fall further.

然而，预留主义者还有别的问题需要关切。种姓政治真是无孔不入啊。8月28日最高法院推翻了安得拉邦政府向贫困的穆斯林预留4%的政府职位和教育席位的努力。同时法院正在斟酌考虑安得拉邦政府去年宣布的更为夸张的措施：为OBCs预留27%的大学席位。为安抚那些愤怒的学生——大多数属于高种姓阶层——政府承诺增加大学学生就读名额。毫无疑问，教育水准要进一步下滑。

Even so, the policy may be unstoppable. Since reservations for the OBCs were introduced in the early 1990s the rise of political parties dedicated to these groups has been inexorable. So has the proliferation of the OBCs, to around 3,000 castes. They include millions who are not poor at all.

即使如此，这项政策估计也无法被阻止。自从针对OBCS的预留制度1990年代实行以来，投身于这些群体的新兴党派可谓前赴后继。因此OBCS的数量激增到了大约3000个种姓。他们中有数百万人根本就不贫穷。

“A massive deliberate confusion” is how Surjit Bhalla, an economist at Oxus Investments, a hedge fund, characterises reservations for the OBCs. When they were awarded reservations, the OBCs were estimated to make up 53% of India's total population. More recent counting suggests they are only about one-third of the population, although their 27% reservation remains unchanged. Moreover, by most measures, the average OBC member is no poorer than the average Indian. “How can you discriminate against the average?” asks Mr Bhalla, despairingly.

一位供职于Oxus Investments对冲基金的经济学家把OBCS预留职位定性为：“大规模的故意混淆”。他们当时获得预留席位的前提是，估计他们的人数约占全印度人口的53%。更多的近期统计数据表明，他们只占全部人口数量的大约三分之一，但是27%的预留率却仍然没有变化。而且，从大多数标准上来衡量，OBCS成员的平均富裕程度并不低于印度整体平均数。“你们怎么能歧视平均水平阶层呢？” Mr Bhalla失望地发问。