印度：商业与种姓制度（下）

There by mistake关联错误

And despair he may. Practically no politician dares speak out against this caste-based racket for fear of being labelled an apologist for the caste system. Rather like guests at the Hotel California, those that join the list never leave—even one or two castes that were allegedly included by mistake. The surpassing example is Tamil Nadu, which reserves a total of 69% of government jobs: 1% for tribal people, 18% for dalits, 30% for the OBCs and 20% for a subset of them—members of castes once categorised by British colonisers as “criminal tribes” and now known more delicately as “de-notified communities”.

他确实失望。事实上因为害怕被帖上种姓制度卫道士的标签，没有任何政治家敢挺身而出反对这个基于种姓制度的骗局。和入住加州酒店的旅客不同，任何种姓一旦进入清单就不再删除——即使偶尔有一、两个种姓因为“失误”被选入。非常明显的例子是泰米尔纳德邦，其预留了全部政府岗位中的69%：1%预留给部族人口，18%给达利特人，30%给OBCS，其余20%给予那些“亚种姓”——这些种姓曾经被不列颠殖民者归类为“犯罪部族”，现在则微妙地被称为“未申报群体”。

There is little opposition to this policy in Tamil Nadu, for two reasons. It is one of India's more literate and prosperous states. And low-caste Hindus are unusually prominent in Tamil Nadu, which suggests to reservationists that the policy is working well. Textiles companies in Tirupur, a T-shirt hub, for example, are mostly owned by gounders, members of a peasant caste that is officially listed as an OBC.

泰米尔纳德邦不会有什么反对此政策的声音，原因有二。第一个原因是印度识字人口增多以及国家繁荣兴旺。低种姓印度教徒在泰米尔纳德邦占有不同寻常的优势地位，他们向预留主义者表示此项政策行之有效。例如，在T恤的生产基地Tirupur，大多数纺织品公司的拥有者都是gounders——被正式列入OBCS的农民种姓成员。

One defender of the policy is N. Vasudevan, chief official of the Kafkaesque vision of bureaucratic hell that is the Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare Department in Chennai, where workers languish behind mountains of never-opened files. Asked when it might end he replies: “When everyone becomes equal.”

这项政策的另一个拥护者是有着卡夫卡式古怪幻想的政务长官N·万瓦苏德万，他把金奈地区的落后阶层、最落后阶层以及少数民族福利局看作是官僚主义所造成的地狱，工人们在小山一样永不开封的文件后苟延残喘。当被问到何时结束这项政策时，他回应说“直到人人都平等的时候。”

There is an alternative view: that Tamil Nadu is more equal than most states not because it has lots of reservations but because, overall, it has been run less badly. It has therefore delivered above-average economic growth, from which low-caste Tamils have benefited.

有一种值得商讨的看法认为：泰米尔纳德邦比大多数邦都平等不是因为其拥有大量的预留席位，而是因为预留制度总的来讲在这里运转得稍微好一点。因此其才有高于平均水平的经济增长率，从而使低种姓泰米尔人获益。

In addition, low-caste businessmen in Tamil Nadu have had opportunities that have nothing to do with government policy. In contrast to north India, where commerce is dominated by members of a few business castes, south India's business community has been more open to members of non-business castes. According to Raman Mahadevan, a business historian, this is partly because members of the south's main trading caste, the chettiars, chose to concentrate their investments outside India during the 19th century, in Malaya and Singapore.

除此之外，泰米尔纳德邦的低种姓商业人士所占有的商业机会同政府的政策并无关系。与北部印度相反(北部印度的商贸业受少数几个商业种姓所支配)，南部印度的商业社会对非商业种姓更为开放。根据商业史学家拉曼mahadevan的研究，造成这种情况的部分原因是，19世纪南部印度主要贸易种姓(the chettiars)成员愿意把资本投入到印度以外的马来西亚和新加坡。

Partly as a result, little large-scale industry emerged in southern India until the 1930s. Around the same time, a popular movement against brahmins—especially lordly in the south—emboldened members of the lower and middle castes, including gounders, who were quick to convert their new assertiveness into business.

结果是截止1930年代为止，少数的大型工业出现在印度南部。大约在同一时期，一股反对婆罗们的运动潮流——在南方尤其壮观——鼓舞了包括gounders在内的中低种姓成员，他们很快改变了固有观念进入商业领域。

The Hindu caste system has never been rigid. Low-caste Hindus do not accept their lumpen position in the hierarchy. Indeed, like middle-class English families, they tend to cherish a myth of their former greatness. By imitating the habits of a more prestigious neighbour, in dress or ritual, some low castes have sneaked a rung or two up the ladder. More recently, in an effort to be classified as an OBC or a dalit caste, some middle-ranking castes have tried to climb a rung or two down.

印度教种姓体系从来就不是刚性的。低种姓印度教徒并不接受他们在阶层体系中被奴役的地位。实际上，象英国的中产阶级家庭一样，他们往往对虚构的贵族祖先传说格外珍视。一些低种姓印度教徒在衣着上或者礼仪上模仿比较有身份的近邻，悄悄地在种姓阶梯上向上爬了一到两个台阶。最近，为了努力被列为为OBCS或者达利特种姓，一些中间种姓群体正尝试着要向下爬一两个台阶。

Meanwhile, on the lowest rung of the ladder, dalit businessmen can be found operating in the informal economy, perhaps as small traders. They must be especially reliant on caste as a business network. But that reliance will change if they can expand into the organised sector. Where businessmen can gain access to credit without having to claim kinship, caste affiliations wither. As Mr Damodaran writes: “A kamma sugar magnate ultimately identifies his interests with other mill-owners and not with fellow kamma cane growers or workers.” And his business may flourish, unfettered.

同时，在种姓阶梯最底端的是达利特商界人士，他们多半属于小商小贩，在非正规市场做着买卖。他们的商业网络关系肯定异乎寻常地需要依赖种姓关系。但是，如果他们进入到有组织的部门，这种依赖就会改变。在那里商家无需表明血缘就能获得信贷，种姓联系也因此而趋于凋零。恰如达莫达兰所写的一样：“一个kamma种姓的糖业大亨最终同别的工厂主拥有共同利益，而非那些kamma种姓的甘蔗栽培者或工人同胞。”只有这样他才能生意兴隆，随心所欲。