世界经济：信贷危机会扣动衰退的扳机么？

The world economy

Will the credit crisis trigger a downturn?

信贷危机会扣动衰退的扳机么？

Sep 20th 2007
From The Economist print edition

Despite the Fed's big interest-rate cut, increasing risk-aversion is likely to depress growth

尽管美联储大幅调低利率，但是持续增长的风险厌恶度可能会压低增长率。

AT THE climax of “The Day the Earth Caught Fire”, a science-fiction film made in 1961, the fate of the planet hangs in the balance. The world's great powers decide to detonate nuclear bombs, hoping to push the Earth off a collision course with the sun. Do they succeed? The final scene shows two versions of the next day's Daily Express: the headline on the first reads “World Saved”; the other, “World Doomed”.

1961年的科幻电影《地球焚毁日》最高潮情节是，整个星球的命运悬而待决。世界强国决定引爆核武器，以期把地球推离同太阳相撞的轨道。他们成功了么？最后的镜头展现了两个版本的《每日快报》：一个版本的标题是：“世界获救”，另一个是“世界毁灭”。

In the 2007 sequel, “The Day the Credit Markets Seized Up”, Wall Street seemed this week almost to have made up its mind about the ending: World Saved, Probably. Financial markets had expected the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates by a quarter of a percentage point on September 18th, but prayed fervently for a half. When the half came, America's markets rejoiced: the S&P 500 index enjoyed its largest rise on a single day since January 2003; the next day share prices elsewhere jumped for joy and junk-bond markets sprang back to life.

在这部电影2007年的续集《信用市场失灵日》中，华尔街似乎这一周都对它的结局信誓旦旦：世界获救，有这个可能。金融市场已经预期联邦储备委员会将于九月十八日降低利率四分之一个百分点，但还是热切的祈求能降低半个百分点。当那半个点数真的降下来时，美国市场欢欣鼓舞：标准普尔500种股票指数兴奋地迎来了自2003年以来的单日最大升幅；第二天，其他的股票价格无不欢呼雀跃，垃圾股也焕发出了第二春。

But on sober appraisal, there is less cause for celebration. Global money markets are still be devilled by banks' need for cash and mistrust of one another: witness the thousands of Britons who queued this week to take their money out of Northern Rock, a mortgage lender. The longer that money-market rates stay high, the greater the danger that expensive credit will start to hurt real economies. Central bankers still have work to do and reputations to make and lose—chief among them Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Fed. Mr Bernanke may have been feted this week. But it will take more than one rate cut, with Wall Street and Congress screaming for it, to make his name. In the past the Fed has been too eager to cut rates repeatedly when markets gripe. Mr Bernanke has yet to show he is not making the same mistake.

但是清醒地来评价，值得庆贺的事并没有那么多。全球货币市场仍然被银行的现金需求和相互的不信任所困饶：本周有人亲眼看见数千名英国人排队从按揭贷款人Northern Rock那 里提款。现金市场利率在高位呆得越久，昂贵的信贷开始伤害当前经济的危险就越大。中央银行家们仍然有很多工作要做，建立声誉并迷失于其中——他们中首当其 冲的是美联储主席本·伯南克。伯南克本周可能是最佳座上客。但是在华尔街和国会山的强烈呼求下，宴会上添上他的名字所需要采取的措施可不仅仅是单一的降 息。过去，当市场紧缩时，美联储太热衷于反复降息的手段了。伯南克至今已向人们表明他没有犯同样的错误。

Reasons to be fearful担心的理由

The size of the Fed's cut and the statement that accompanied it signified fear more than hope (see article). The central bank hopes to “forestall some of the adverse effects” of the credit crunch on the economy. But trouble may be coming anyway. The housing market's malaise is deepening all the while. This week's symptoms were a 12-year low in housing starts and a doubling of foreclosures in a year. No wonder housebuilders are their gloomiest since the 1991 recession.

美联储降息的幅度以及随后的声明意味着担心多于希望。中央银行希望“阻止(信贷紧缩对经济的)不利影响”。但是麻烦可能无论如何都会浮现。同时，住房市场的弊病却更深了。本周的症状表现为：住宅兴建量达十二年以来的最低点，抵押房产赎回权的丧失率在一年内提高了一倍。毫无疑问这是自1991年的大萧条以来住房投资商最暗淡的日子了。

If America is set for a sharp slowdown, or even a recession, it is sure to import less from other countries. That, however, is not the main danger to the rest of the world. Both Europe and Asia are less dependent on American growth than they used to be. Europe is now on a par with America as a market for Chinese exports. Sales to America account for less than 3% of euro-zone GDP. And some rebalancing of the world economy—a smaller American current-account deficit, a weaker dollar—is no bad thing.

如果美国提出了大幅衰退或者说甚至是萧条的任务，那么减少从其他国家的进口则是必然的。然而，那不是对世界其他国家的主要威胁。因为欧洲和亚洲均比以往更少依赖于美国的增长。对中国的出口市场来讲，欧洲和美国所占的分额相当。销售到美国的商品在欧元区的GDP中所占的分额还不到整体的3%。些许的对世界经济的重新平衡——减少经常帐目赤字，唱衰美元——未尝不是好事。

The real source of pain is the rise in borrowing costs in both America and Europe. Granted, things are a little better than they were. The gap between three-month interbank rates and Treasury bills, a measure of the risk of lending to other banks rather than Uncle Sam, has narrowed in recent days, helped by the Fed's cut. Sterling interbank rates also fell, notably after the Bank of England abandoned its refusal to intervene in the three-month money market. But the about-turn came only after the panic at Northern Rock—and has heightened criticism of the governor, Mervyn King. Central banks must hope that a turning point has been reached, but interbank rates are still high. There is a long way to go.

真 正的疼痛来源是欧洲和美国的借贷成本上升。当然了，情况略好于过去。借助于美联储的降息，衡量向其他银行而非山姆大叔放贷的风险标准——三个月期限的同业 拆借率和国库券之间的差距——缩小了。值得注意的是，在英格兰银行放弃其拒绝干涉三个月期限现金市场立场之后，英镑的同业拆借率也下降了。但是这个大逆转 是在Northern Rock银行的大恐慌之后才产生的，这加深了人们对管理者Mervyn King的批评。中央银行肯定希望某个转折点已经抵达，但是拆借率仍然偏高。路仍然漫漫。

From celebration to calibration先庆祝后调整

A lot of this pain, alas, is necessary. Central banks have been saying for months that risk had become underpriced. Well, now the repricing is at hand, and it is not going to be fun. Banks have to work out the cost of the damage done by years of easy credit and gorging on complicated financial products (see article). It could take months to put prices on the complicated mix of assets for which they are ultimately liable. Meanwhile, they will want to keep cash to themselves rather than lend to others. And in future they may be choosier about who they lend to, directly or indirectly.

大 量的这种痛苦，唉，还是必要的。中央银行不停地说风险已经变得过低了。好了，现手握重新定价的利器，却发现并不是那么有趣。银行不得不计算出多年放宽信贷 条件所造成的损害成本，然后贪婪地大吃错综复杂的金融产品大餐。这会需要花费几个月时间去给那些银行最终仍要负责的错综复杂的资产组合定价。同时，他们都 更希望把现金留给自己，而非向别人放贷。也许在将来，他们会直接或者间接地慎重选择他们的借贷对象。

This is not to say that securitisation is about to be uninvented. It cannot be and should not be. In recent weeks the dangers of financial innovation—the divorce of originator from ultimate lender; the sheer complexity of some derivatives—have become plain. The benefits remain, not least the increased ability of households to smooth spending over their lifetimes and of markets to allocate risks to those most willing to bear them (see article). But there are cycles in all things: underpricing begets excess, which begets a reckoning. For a while at least, many people and businesses will have to pay more to borrow, or will not be able to borrow at all. The results will be felt in markets for housing—America's was far from the frothiest—as well as junk bonds and corporate buy-outs.

这并非说证券化将要被非创造化。不能也不应该。最近几周的金融创新的危险——创办人从最终放款人中脱离；一些衍生产品十足的复杂性——已经很清晰明了。高收益依然如旧，保持家庭终生平稳消费的能力在持续增长，向那些最愿承担风险的人分摊市场风险的功能也在加强(请看本期专题) 。但是这一切都遵从一个循环：过低定价招致过剩，而过剩又招致呆坏帐。至少在短时期内，许多个人和企业将不得不偿还更多借款，或者根本就无力借贷。这个结果将在不仅在住房供给市场——美国的住房供给市场距离泡沫还有很远——上得以体现，还会体现在垃圾股与公司赎回市场上。

To some extent, easier monetary policy may soothe the transition. Already some central banks have held off interest-rate increases that looked certain a few weeks ago. But even if some of these eventually cut rates, they are unlikely wholly to reverse the tightening of conditions just yet. The markets are in effect raising rates on the central banks' behalf. These monetary policymakers are unlikely to forget inflation in a hurry.

就 某种程度上来讲，宽松的货币政策可能对过渡期起到缓和作用。部分中央银行已经阻住了利率的升高，几周以前利率的升高看起来似乎要成定局。但是即使他们中的 一些央行最终削减利率，他们也不大可能恰在此时完全扭转紧缩的局势。代表中央银行利益的市场正在有效加速。那些货币政策的制定者不太可能如此迅速地忘记通 货膨胀。

But might the Fed? It says not. And given the recent run of economic data, inflation hardly seems an imminent threat. That ought to help to protect Mr Bernanke from the charge levelled at Alan Greenspan, his predecessor. Under Mr Greenspan, whose memoirs came out this week (see article), the Fed won a name for being quick to cut rates when markets squealed but slow to raise them when the economy picked up. The housing boom—and today's mess—are the result.

那 么美联储会忘记么？它给出的回答是否定的。考虑到当前经济数据的走向，通货膨胀似乎很难会是迫在眉睫的威胁。这应该会有助于保护伯南克远离他的前人艾伦· 格林斯潘所受到的“平衡”指责。根据本周出笼的格林斯潘的回忆录，美联储赢得了这样一个名声：当市场告急时迅速降息，但是经济回升时却疏于回调。住房市场 的繁荣——以及现在的一团糟——就是那种做法的后果。

Having delivered a half-point cut rather than a quarter, Mr Bernanke is not yet free of the suspicion that he will follow Mr Greenspan's path. Nor is he surely guilty. His Fed has cut rates with the economy looking ropy—but also with bankers and politicians trying to bully him. The hope is that he acted because he saw a gloomy outlook. The fear is that he did so because it is hard for central bankers to say no.

虽 然抛出半个点数的降息远胜于四分之一点，但是伯南克仍然无法使人抛开其重蹈格林斯潘覆辙的疑惑。并且他也确实不该承担责任。他主导的美联储在看起来不仅束 手缚脚的经济体系中降低了利息——并且那些银行和政客还试图恐吓他。如果他降息是因为他看见了一个暗淡的前景，那么这令人充满希望。如果他降息是因为中央 银行很难说不，那么这会令人忧心憧憧。